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Scientific Realism in
Constitutional Law
David L. Faigman†
I.

INTRODUCTION

In scholarly circles a debate rages over whether
scientific research describes true underlying realities of the
natural world or merely represents constructed accounts of
observed events.1 Much of this debate involves natural science
and reaches such fundamental issues as whether, for example,
we can positively conclude that electrons exist or must be
limited to statements about the observed effects of electrons,
since we cannot observe those subatomic particles directly.
Scientific realists argue that science is not simply a collection
of hypotheses supported by empirical tests, but actually
describes an underlying reality that exists outside of human
observers. The world, according to this view, is “mind
independent.” The core philosophical disagreement found in
the natural sciences can also be found in the many other
disciplines in which knowledge about the empirical world is
essential, from the social sciences to the humanities, only more
so. Any mind-dependence infecting physics would impair the
social sciences and humanities at many times the rate. Not
surprisingly, therefore, the law, as a consumer of these
empirically conscious disciplines, is deeply affected by these
debates and, to some extent, must choose sides. In the law, the
question whether reality is real or not is more than an
academic debate. The law’s response to this debate has, not to
put too fine an ironic point on it, substantial real-world
consequences.

†
John F. Digardi Distinguished Professor of Law, University of California,
Hastings College of the Law.
1
See generally JAMES ROBERT BROWN, WHO RULES IN SCIENCE: AN
OPINIONATED GUIDE TO THE WARS (2001); STATHIS PSILLOS, SCIENTIFIC REALISM: HOW
SCIENCE TRACKS TRUTH (1999); MICHAEL DEVITT, REALISM AND TRUTH (2d ed. 1991).
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A diversity of views is represented by the label
“scientific realism.” Among the choices of philosophical starting
premises, however, realism most centrally embraces the notion
that science discovers “truth.” Truth, albeit with a lowercase t,
does not necessarily imply that scientists can say unambiguously or with certainty that the world operates in a particular
fashion. Rather, the world exists in particular ways, and
science more or less—or with greater or lesser precision—
endeavors to describe that world. But science is a human
enterprise and a community effort. The real truth, therefore,
may be known only rarely and, even then, only after extensive
study and many missteps. Still, its existence largely makes the
scientific effort worthwhile. Scientific methods permit the
development of a body of knowledge about the world that does
not depend on the cultural backgrounds or values of its
originators. In common parlance, science can be “objective,” in
that it can be tested “inter-subjectively” by different people in
different places having different values.2 Realists believe that
scientific methods provide an objective lens through which the
world can be described, if only imprecisely.3
Challenges to realism come from a wide assortment of
disciplines, including, among others, philosophy, sociology, and
literary theory. Critical scholars in these fields4 contest the
objectivity of knowledge and dispute the claim of mindindependence that realists believe is possible.5 While there are
indeed widely ranging views regarding the inscrutable issue of
the reality of “truth,” necessity requires a simpler presentation
of the debate in this essay. From the law’s perspective—and,
more particularly, from the perspective of constitutional
adjudication—the matter comes down to either believing that
science can describe the empirical world largely free of bias or
that it cannot. If facts having relevance to constitutional
lawmaking do not exist—or cannot be described—separately
from the values endemic in that lawmaking, then it is
2
KARL POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 44 (Harper & Row
1968) (1959) (“[T]he objectivity of scientific statements lies in the fact that they can be
inter-subjectively tested.” (emphasis in original)).
3
See generally WILLIAM P. ALSTON, A REALIST CONCEPTION OF TRUTH
(1996).
4
See generally BROWN, supra note 1.
5
Professor Susan Haack refers to them as the “New Cynics.” She notes that
they disagree among themselves “on the finer points,” but generally agree that
“concern for truth, is a kind of illusion, a smokescreen disguising the operations of
power, politics, and rhetoric.” SUSAN HAACK, DEFENDING SCIENCE—WITHIN REASON
20-21 (2003).
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incumbent on courts not to pretend that they do. Facts and
values (or biases), under this view, may not be one, but they
are inextricably bound. If this is so, anti-realism is the more
rational choice to provide the philosophical basis for constitutional adjudication. But if facts can exist independently of
biasing influences, as I believe they can, then courts should
fully account for them in their decisions. In short, scientific
realism obligates courts to take facts seriously.6
The anti-realist claim that must be rebutted in order to
substantiate my argument that facts ought to be taken
seriously in constitutional cases is associated with the belief
that scientific knowledge is largely socially constructed.
Adherents of social constructionism fall along a wide spectrum
of beliefs, with some subscribing to more or less extreme
versions. Indeed, many realists share the concerns that lie at
the core of anti-realist critiques of science. Scientific realists
well appreciate, for example, the effects a researcher’s values
might have on how hypotheses are formed or what methods are
selected to test them. Similarly, realists generally accept, at
least in principle, Thomas Kuhn’s basic claim that theoretical
paradigms affect the problems scientists study and the answers
they obtain.7 To a large extent, the difference between sober
realists and sensible anti-realists is one of degree or emphasis.
Anti-realists generally hold the view that scientific statements
are so imbued with the values and social and historical
contexts of their declarants that they are effectively normative
in scope. They deny any special claim of “objectivity” to
scientific facts and, in effect, deny the fact-value distinction
altogether.
6

Although the perspective to be defended here is the realist one, as opposed
to anti-realist and social constructivist alternatives, I need not defend a strong version
of this perspective. For example, scientific realism is sometimes juxtaposed to
empiricism. Whereas scientific realists posit the true existence of unobservable
entities, empiricists are content to be agnostic about underlying realities, though still
committed to the rationality of hypothesis formation and test. The empiricist tradition
thus seeks to demonstrate “that theoretical discourse may be so construed that it does
not commit to the existence of unobservable entities.” PSILLOS, supra note 1, at 3. In
contrast, the realist tradition “aims to show that a full and just explication of
theoretical discourse in science requires commitment to the existence of unobservable
entities.” Id. From the law’s perspective, however, this particular debate is academic,
since empiricists and realists agree on the virtue of rigorous hypothesis testing.
Empiricism and realism share the attribute that I refer to as taking facts seriously.
Compared to strong anti-realist views, therefore, realism and empiricism are close
cousins.
7
See THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 43-51
(1970); see also BROWN, supra note 1, at 63-71 (discussing Kuhn and realists’ responses
to him).
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Realists, in contrast, believe that the world exists
independently of the minds of its explorers and that the
methods of science are largely effective in discovering the
mechanics of that world. While biases can—and too often do—
infect the explorations of scientists, scientific methods are
designed and employed to limit that bias as much as possible.
Hence, when failures occur, as they have and inevitably will,
they are attributable to the scientists, not science. The solution
is to strive for better scientific research, not abandon the
enterprise.
Although the United States Supreme Court is an
eminently realist institution in that the justices almost
certainly see themselves as situated in a mind-independent
real world, the Court tends to employ facts as though they were
subjects of social construction. The Court insistently employs
factual arguments rhetorically, as premises that can be
manipulated or massaged in the service of one or another legal
outcome.8 The Court has largely constructed an empirical world
that serves the normative vision it holds for the Constitution.
For example, it may be that the Fourth Amendment right to be
free from unreasonable search and seizure is defined in light of
an “objective” person’s “reasonable expectations of privacy,” 9
but the justices make no attempt to match the empirical reality
of such expectations with constitutional outcomes. The Court’s
subjective construction of those expectations establishes the
contours of the Fourth Amendment right. The justices,
therefore, stand in the untenable position of subscribing to
scientific realism as a foundational philosophy, but act as antirealists in crafting constitutional outcomes. To vary an old
saying, they want to have their cake and make us eat it too.
In this Essay, I examine whether facts can be treated
realistically in constitutional decision making. In particular, I
consider two potentially insurmountable challenges to a
scientifically realist constitutional jurisprudence. The first is
the question of whether the sorts of facts the Constitution
makes relevant—primarily behavioral and societal facts
studied by social scientists—can be studied relatively
objectively. The second is whether the constitutional inquiries
in which facts play a part are hopeless conglomerations, so that
8

See David L. Faigman, “Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding”: Exploring
the Empirical Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 54950 (1991).
9
See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338-39 (2000).
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the empirical and the normative cannot be separated. I
conclude that while both of these issues present formidable
challenges, neither is fatal to the development of a scientifically
realist constitutional jurisprudence.
II.

REALIZING A SCIENTIFICALLY REALISTIC JURISPRUDENCE

It must be emphasized at the outset that believing that
scientists study true underlying realities says little about the
value of a particular research program for the law. Although
some fact may be “true,” this does not mean that particular
legal consequences flow from that “truth.” The law is an
applied discipline and so the issue of whether genes truly exist,
for example, does not answer the question of how, or even
whether, research indicating some genetic predisposition is
legally cognizable. In the simplest of terms, “is” does not entail
“ought.” At its best, science has no particular political agenda.
For instance, discovering a genetic basis for pedophilia might
have multiple legal impacts, variously having “liberal” or
“conservative” consequences. For instance, this genetic
evidence may be used by defendants to support an insanity
plea or by prosecutors to establish guilt; both defense lawyers
and prosecutors may use this proof at sentencing; and the state
will undoubtedly seek to use this sort of evidence in
commitment hearings of alleged sexually violent predators.
Good science is neither inherently liberal nor conservative.
It is also important to emphasize that applied science is
invariably variable. What is “true” generally will be true only
some of the time in practice.10 The “truth” of the empirical
connection between genes and pedophilia is not the ultimate
question in most legal disputes. While the general truth is
certainly pertinent, the operative issue typically will be
whether some particular person has acted (or will act in the
10

It is worth noting that even general “truths” in science are provisional, or
uncertain, in a variety of ways. General findings are only as good as the research
supporting them and, especially in the behavioral sciences, are usually described
probabilistically. For example, psychologists have found that cross-racial
identifications are less reliable than same-race identifications. See Christian A.
Meissner & John C. Brigham, Thirty Years of Investigating the Own-Race Bias in
Memory for Faces: A Meta-Analytic Review, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 3, 4 (2001).
Although this is a well-researched phenomenon, it is not invariable. See Stephanie J.
Platz & Harmon M. Hosch, Cross-Racial/Ethnic Eyewitness Identification: A Field
Study, 18 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 972, 972-73 (1988). In addition, even the best
believed scientific truths might someday be overturned by new discoveries or more
inclusive theories.
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future) in accordance with this genetic predisposition. However
true the underlying reality, this knowledge will be probabilistic
in application. As with virtually all applied science, research
will at best illuminate the statistical relations between factors.
Moreover, in most cases, the hypothesized empirical connection, itself probabilistically described, will be clouded by the
possibility of factors never studied and systematic and random
error endemic to any research program. Research, for example,
might indicate that forty-five percent of men with a specific set
of, say, thirteen genes will be sexual aggressors. This, of course,
would be highly relevant information. Yet, fifty-five percent of
men with these genes will not be sexual aggressors. It may be
that environmental factors or other variables partly explain
which men will act on their seeming predispositions and which
will not. Whatever the case, when it comes to individual
statements of fact, the best that scientists can do is speak in
terms of probabilities and statistics.
The probabilistic character of applied science is an
inherent limitation of the discipline. The tools of science,
therefore, are limited in their capacity to describe the world
that the law regulates. Importantly, however, the uncertainty,
or error, associated with scientific tools is primarily random
rather than systematic. In other words, the error is randomly
distributed among political outcomes and does not systematically prefer the conclusions particular researchers might favor.
The anti-realist critique is directed at the prospect
of systematic error. Anti-realists believe that researchers’
subjective biases infuse the design and interpretation of their
work. They do not believe reality exists separately from
researchers’ statements. The reality is in the words, not
the world. To many in the law, however, asking whether
constitutional facts are mind-independent will strike them as
patently absurd. Indeed, even among anti-realists, the strong
version of the claim is truly endorsed by only a small group of
skeptics, and one might wonder how strongly even they believe
it. Even the most ardent anti-realists look both ways when they
cross the street. But a somewhat weaker form of anti-realism
might have a place in constitutional cases. This is so for two
independent reasons.
First, many of the facts having constitutional
significance come from the so-called softer disciplines of psychiatry, psychology, economics, political science, and sociology.
These fields have a history of producing socially dependent
knowledge and employ methods that limit their power to
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transcend time, place, and setting. Unlike many of the natural
sciences, these fields tend to produce results that are weak
in explanatory power, methodological rigor, and demonstrated
reproducibility.
The second reason to believe that a weak form of antirealism has a place in constitutional cases is that, in practice,
the Court tends to amalgamate constitutional facts and
constitutional norms. For example, in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Court held that previability abortion regulations violate the Constitution if they
“unduly burden” the right of reproductive choice.11 The Court
defined as unduly burdensome laws that create a “substantial
obstacle” to the exercise of the right.12 Whether a law places
obstacles in the path of a woman’s exercise of her right to an
abortion is an empirical question. Whether these obstacles
qualify as substantial obstacles—enough to create an undue
burden—is a question that contains a strong normative
component. The undue burden standard, therefore, creates a
constitutional problem that is an admixture of fact and value,
and thus arguably contemplates a socially constructed answer.
This section considers the two basic forms of antirealism as they might be manifested in constitutional cases.
Due to space considerations, the following discussion is limited
to social science, which is the predominant form of science
found in constitutional cases. Also, if the case is made
successfully with social science, its more muscular cousins
should pass philosophical muster easily.13 Part A first considers
whether the social sciences can achieve some measure of
objectivity. Part B then considers whether constitutional
standards, such as the undue burden test of Casey, can be
untangled so that the factual elements can be examined
independently of the normative insights that inform them.

11

Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992).
Id. at 846.
13
This essay focuses on science; space constraints preclude my consideration
of history, the penultimate (and possibly ultimate) source of factual information in
constitutional cases. In the admittedly misleading hierarchy of objectivity, if the
methods of natural science allow it to be more objective than social science, the
methods of social science allow it to be more objective than history. Hence, on balance,
the anti-realist critique resonates somewhat more with historical “truth” than scientific
“truth”—though good history is much more than mere social constructions.
12
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Soft Science and Social Construction

Implicit or explicit in virtually all discussions of the
significance of social science findings to legal decision-making
lies the question of whether social inquiry can be scientific.
Perhaps the most often repeated criticism of social science is
that it is inherently value laden.14 A component of this
argument is based on the truism that, as human beings, social
scientists study themselves. Social scientists bring too much
baggage of their own to the laboratory, the argument goes, to
be able to study other people’s behavior objectively. Without
question, social scientists’ values affect the kinds of research
they do and, at least indirectly, their findings. This is true of
the natural sciences as well. The topics selected for study, the
variables identified as worthy of measurement, and, to some
extent, the interpretation of findings, depend on the values,
interests, and intentions of the scientist and the times in which
he or she lives. The principal advantage of scientific methods is
not that they eliminate researchers’ biases, only that they help
to control and reveal the biases that do exist.
Essentially six basic sources of bias in social inquiry can
be readily identified: (1) the selection of problems, (2) the
definition of the subject of study, (3) the methodological choices
made, (4) the determination of the contents of conclusions,
(5) the division of fact from value, and (6) the assessment of
evidence.15 Although these six sources of bias constitute
significant challenges to social scientific inquiry, they do not
doom the project.
1. Selecting Problems
Social scientists have long been criticized for spending a
disproportionate amount of time on law-related issues about
which the law cares relatively little. For example, researchers’
efforts to study juries is out of all proportion either to the
14
See Martha L. Fineman & Anne Opie, The Uses of Social Science Data in
Legal Policymaking: Custody Determinations at Divorce, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 107, 127;
David M. O’Brien, The Seduction of the Judiciary: Social Science and the Courts, 64
JUDICATURE 8, 12 (1980); see also Harry Willmer Jones, Legal Inquiry and the Methods
of Science, in LAW AND THE SOCIAL ROLE OF SCIENCE 120, 128-29 (Harry Willmer Jones
ed., 1966).
15
This section owes a considerable intellectual debt to Professor Ernst Nagel,
who posited—and refuted—several of these sources of bias in his extraordinary book
The Structure of Science. See generally ERNST NAGEL, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENCE:
PROBLEMS IN THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION (1961).
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number of trials or to the number of trials involving juries.
Additionally, a brief perusal of the social science and law
literature would suggest that eyewitness identification is the
most important empirical issue facing the legal system.16
Although social scientists have increasingly expanded their
research focus to new areas of the law,17 it remains fair to
complain that they concentrate inordinately on juries, witnesses, and criminals. Behavioral issues in other areas, such as
constitutional law, torts, and property, are largely ignored.
Not surprisingly, social scientists tend to select
problems on the basis of their interests, their understanding of
the law, and the amenability of the problems to scientific study.
Thus, the proliferation of studies on eyewitness identification is
understandable, in that it flows naturally from a long history of
research on human perception and memory. Also, a non-lawyer
can easily understand the danger of eyewitness misidentification and its importance to the law.18 Thus, unlike complex
legal and psychological issues, such as the coercive impact of
religiously inspired prayer at graduation ceremonies,19 eyewitness perception requires little legal sophistication and is
relatively easy to research. Moreover, the eyewitness research
literature has been an influential component of public policy
debates and has led to a variety of contemporary reforms.20
Psychologists interested in having an impact on public policy,
therefore, have naturally focused on a subject as readily
amenable to study as eyewitness identification.
Criticism of problem selection in the social sciences
should be directed more at the possible lack of relevance of the
research and less at the inherent value bias of the researchers.
In general, scientists select problems on the basis of what
seems important, and to this extent all science is culture16
See Michael J. Saks, The Law Does Not Live By Eyewitness Testimony
Alone, 10 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 279, 279 (1986). But see Wallace D. Loh, Psycholegal
Research: Past and Present, 79 MICH. L. REV. 659, 678 (1981).
17
Outside of jury and eyewitness work, promising areas of study include
children’s memory, predictions of future violence, judgment and decision-making, and
fMRI brain research.
18
See Elizabeth F. Loftus, Reconstructing Memory: The Incredible
Eyewitness, 15 JURIMETRICS J. 188, 190 (1975) (“Since eyewitness testimony carries so
much weight, it is important to find out why distortion occurs in a witness’ memory.”).
19
See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592-93 (1992) (applying what Justice
Scalia called the “psychological coercion” test to measure Establishment Clause
violations, id. at 632 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
20
See, e.g., TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP FOR EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A GUIDE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 3 (Oct.
1999), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/178240.pdf.
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bound. But in the context of science and law, the criticism
that scientists’ biases influence the hypotheses they test is
particularly misplaced. In the end, it is the law that dictates
which hypotheses merit study.
In Witherspoon v. Illinois, for example, the Court
considered the question of the constitutionality of an Illinois
statute providing that “‘[i]n trials for murder it shall be a cause
for challenge of any juror who shall, on being examined, state
that he has conscientious scruples against capital punishment,
or that he is opposed to the same.’”21 The challenger argued
that common sense and the research available indicated that
excluding jurors who oppose capital punishment (called
“Witherspoon-excludables”) would result in a jury biased in
favor of conviction. Justice Stewart, writing for the Court,
agreed that this empirical question was constitutionally
relevant and deplored the lack of data to answer it:
The data adduced by the petitioner . . . are too tentative and
fragmentary to establish that jurors not opposed to the death
penalty tend to favor the prosecution in the determination of guilt.
We simply cannot conclude, either on the basis of the record now
before us or as a matter of judicial notice, that the exclusion of jurors
opposed to capital punishment results in an unrepresentative jury
on the issue of guilt or substantially increases the risk of
conviction.22

The Witherspoon Court, therefore, left open the question
whether research might yet demonstrate that excluding those
opposed to capital punishment from the guilt-phase of capital
trials might produce panels that have a propensity for finding
defendants guilty: “[A] defendant convicted by such a jury in
some future case might still attempt to establish that the jury
was less than neutral with respect to guilt.”23

21
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 512 (1968) (quoting 38 ILL. REV.
STAT. § 743 (1959) (current version at 38 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/115-4(d) (West
2007)). A juror can be excused for cause only if he or she opposes the death penalty and
would be unable to set aside those scruples and follow applicable law. Wainwright v.
Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985). The determination whether a particular juror is
excludable is within the discretion of the trial court and is owed deference on appeal.
Uttecht v. Brown, 127 S. Ct. 2218, 2224 (2007).
22
Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 517-18.
23
Id. at 520 n.18 (emphasis in original). The Court continued as follows: “If
he were to succeed in that effort, the question would then arise whether the State’s
interest in submitting the penalty issue to a jury capable of imposing capital
punishment may be vindicated at the expense of the defendant’s interest in a
completely fair determination of guilt or innocence . . . .” Id.
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The social science community’s response to the Court’s
entreaty was extraordinary.24 Social scientists conducted more
than a dozen reported studies on the effects of excluding jurors
opposed to capital punishment.25 The near-consensus of the
investigators and reviewers of this research corroborated the
intuitive judgment of the petitioner in Witherspoon that
excluding death-qualified jurors would result in conviction
prone juries.26 The courts, therefore, have the power to
influence the social science agenda. There is no question that
an explicit, or even a veiled, call for data will cause social
scientists to come to the Court’s assistance.
Whether such assistance will be heeded, or heeded well,
is something that, history suggests, is questionable at best.
Social scientists’ Witherspoon experience well illustrates the
dangers associated with taking seriously the Court’s
expressions of interest in data. In Lockhart v. McCree, the
Court rejected both the validity and the relevance of the many
studies done in response to the Witherspoon Court’s call for
research.27 On the one hand, Chief Justice (then Justice)
Rehnquist repudiated the validity of the fifteen studies McCree
had introduced because of “several serious flaws”28 Rehnquist
found in the research.29 On the other hand, Rehnquist stated
that even assuming the validity of this research, “the
Constitution does not prohibit the States from ‘death
qualifying’ juries in capital cases.”30 In effect, Rehnquist’s
24
See Michael Finch & Mark Ferraro, The Empirical Challenge to DeathQualified Juries: On Further Examination, 65 NEB. L. REV. 21, 24 (1986) (“In the
seventeen years following Witherspoon, death qualification has been one of the most
studied subjects in the area of sociological jurisprudence.”). See generally William C.
Thompson, Death Qualification After Wainwright v. Witt and Lockhart v. McCree, 13
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 185 (1989) (analyzing the Court’s treatment of social science in
constitutional litigation concerning death qualification and discussing the future role of
such research).
25
Finch & Ferraro, supra note 24, at 24-25.
26
Finch and Ferraro reported that the data supported three hypotheses:

(1) jurors excluded because of their inability to impose the death penalty are
more attitudinally disposed to favor the accused than are non-excluded
jurors; (2) excluded jurors are more likely to be black or female than nonexcluded jurors; and (3) excluded jurors are more likely to actually acquit the
accused than are non-excluded jurors.
Id. at 25.
27
28
29

476 U.S. 162, 168-69, 171-72 (1986).
Id. at 168-69.
For an in-depth discussion of these “flaws,” see Faigman, supra note 8, at

590-92.
30

Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 173.
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Lockhart decision repudiated Stevens’s legal analysis in
Witherspoon, and found that the research was irrelevant to the
applicable constitutional provisions—the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments—that applied in the case.31
Although it is true that studying a phenomenon gives it
32
lawmakers remain the ultimate arbiters of a
status,
phenomenon’s importance. In most cases, researchers take
their cue from the agenda set by lawmakers. Even when social
scientists are ahead of the law in identifying and studying
factors of possible importance, lawmakers must independently
assess the legal relevance of the factors identified. Certainly,
policymakers should never defer to social scientists’ ordering of
phenomena, just as they must guard against singling out for
reliance certain factors simply because these factors have been
the subject of scientific testing. As long as lawmakers are
deciding the areas of importance, however, they have no
ground to criticize the researchers’ fidelity.
2. Defining the Subject of Study
Underlying the realist perspective is the key
methodological tool of replication. If cold fusion exists, for
example, it should be demonstrable whether the researchers
are in Provo, Palo Alto, or Princeton. The first lesson of
scientific publication is that enough detail must be provided so
that a reader could replicate the study. This requirement
serves two essential functions. First, it permits what Karl
Popper called inter-subjective testability.33 If the research
findings have merit, other researchers in other settings should
be able to obtain substantially the same results. Second, and of
special concern to the law, this requirement informs readers
regarding how the researchers concretely defined the object of
their study. An essential step in science, therefore, is to make
amorphous concepts concrete for the purpose of study by
defining them operationally.34
The need to operationally define terms is pervasive in
science, whether it is physics or psychology. Consider concepts
such as persistent vegetative state, intelligence, deterrence,
31

See Faigman, supra note 8, at 594-95 (discussing the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment standards set forth in Lockhart).
32
See Fineman & Opie, supra note 14, at 125 n.50.
33
POPPER, supra note 2, at 44.
34
See PSILLOS, supra note 1, at 5.
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bio-diversity, competence, violence, prurient interest, viability,
involuntary euthanasia, reasonable expectations of privacy,
and so forth. These terms are not self-defining. Scientists must
somehow make concrete, for purposes of measurement, the
vague and indefinite concepts of the law. Notions of justice,
fairness, and equality are hardly self-defining. They must be
operationally defined. Herbert Feigl nicely explained the
matter as follows:
To put it briefly, if crudely, operational analysis is to enable us to
decide whether a given term in the way it is used, has a “cash value,”
i.e., factual reference. If it does have factual reference, operational
analysis is to show us precisely what that factual reference is, in
terms, ultimately, of the data of direct observation.35

The issue of defining abstract concepts operationally is
not unique to social science. Moreover, usually there is some
choice involved in how something should be operationalized,
and a researcher should be obligated to explain why he or she
made one decision rather than another. Consider the simple
example of temperature. Temperature cannot be directly
observed, but might be operationally defined as “the linear
expansion of a mercury column in a glass tube of even width.”36
But this time-honored mode is not the only way to measure
how hot or cold it is outside. For example, meteorologists might
measure temperature by “windchill.” Windchill combines
thermometer readings with wind speed and takes into account
physiological factors, such as heat loss from the body (i.e.,
modern heat transfer theory).37
An indispensable part of evaluating any scientific
research program ostensibly relevant to a legal matter,
therefore, requires that lawyers ensure that the researchers
studied the phenomenon that the law is interested in having
studied. Consider, for example, the issue of children’s
competency to make complex decisions, an issue that arises in
a multitude of constitutional contexts.38 How can we be sure
that the “competence” the courts speak about is the same
35
Herbert Feigl, Operationism and Scientific Method, 52 PSYCHOL. REV. 250,
252-53 (1945) (emphasis in original).
36
Id. at 254.
37
For an excellent discussion of wind chill, including conversion charts, see
Nat’l Weather Serv., Windchill: Frequently Asked Questions, Terms and Definitions,
http://www.weather.gov/om/windchill/index.shtml (last visited Sept. 12, 2007).
38
See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (requiring competency to
be executed); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (requiring competency to consent to
hospitalization in a mental facility).
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“competence” the social scientists measured in their research?
The short answer to this question is that we cannot be sure;
but a court can compare what the social scientists did with its
own conception of competence. For example, in evaluating
juveniles’ “competency” to waive their Miranda rights,
Professor Thomas Grisso identified primarily three components
of competency reflected in the legal literature: (1) comprehension of rights, (2) beliefs about legal context, and (3) problem
solving style.39 Since Professor Grisso’s tests of competency are
based on courts’ explanations of the concept, courts might be
expected to find his results to be of some assistance to their
original inquiry. The important point is that such a comparison
can be made. Whether the psychological measure of competence adequately meets the legal conception of competence,
therefore, can be evaluated by lawmakers who want to rely on
the science. Hence, the law must, initially, identify the concept
of interest and, in the end, decide whether scientists who have
studied the concept of interest have done so adequately.
3. Methodological Choices Made
Science does not exist as a separate repository into
which all well-founded knowledge is poured. Science is a
dynamic enterprise that spans subject areas ranging from the
lowly microbe to the grand universe. The scientific method,
therefore, is not one method. It is an orientation or approach to
empirical exploration.40 Different subjects demand different
modes of analysis. Both electrons and electricians can be topics
of scientific inquiry, but the particle physicists and industrialorganizational psychologists who study these respective
subjects necessarily use very different techniques. But within
areas of study, not all methods are equal, and they are not all
employed equally well. Some methods provide brilliant probes
into the operation of phenomena and others offer little more
than dim glimpses of fleeting truths. Science, across the
disciplinary landscape, from acoustics to zoology, is marked by
39
Thomas Grisso, Juveniles’ Waiver of Rights: Legal and Psychological
Competence, in 3 PERSPECTIVES IN LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY 41-58 (Bruce Dennis Sales
ed., 1981); see also Lois A. Weithorn & Susan B. Campbell, The Competency of Children
and Adolescents to Make Informed Treatment Decisions, 53 CHILD DEV. 1589, 1594-95
(1982) (evaluating competency on four scales: evidence of choice, reasonable outcome,
rational reasons, and understanding).
40
See HAACK, supra note 5, at 10 (“There is no distinctive, timeless ‘scientific
method,’ only the modes of inference and procedures common to all serious inquiry.”).
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methodological variability. An approach that is appropriate, or
even possible, for a problem in celestial mechanics may be
entirely inapplicable for a problem in cellular biology. Indeed,
very often in science, a single paradigm will not be sufficient to
study any particular phenomenon. New drugs are tested first
in laboratory animals and second on humans, and both
methods are tools of science.
Since scientific knowledge—or “the truth”—is only as
good as the methods that researchers bring to bear to discover
it, it behooves judges and lawyers to have some sophistication
about those methods.41 The law, of course, relies on a wide
assortment of scientific expertise, so it might be unrealistic to
expect that judges will be able to develop proficiency in all of
them. For example, the American Psychological Association’s
amicus brief in the juvenile death penalty case of Roper v.
Simmons advanced data from behavioral studies conducted by
psychologists and brain-imaging studies done by neuroscientists.42 How can judges be expected to be critical
consumers of such disparate forms of science?
The short answer is that they have no choice. The real
question is not whether they can do it, but how they should go
about doing it. The science exists and judicial decisions that
ignore the empirical implications of the decision still have realworld consequences. A judge’s ignorance of causes might make
him or her ignorant of the consequences of a particular
decision, but the consequences still occur. Hence, for example,
if research indicates a high false positive rate for predictions of
violence in the civil commitment of sexually violent predators,
ignoring this research, as the Court has done,43 does not alter
the fact that many people are wrongly deprived of their liberty.
Although the task for judges appears daunting, it is not
as difficult as it might first appear. First of all, most of the
research that is introduced in constitutional cases is not rocket
science. An elementary understanding of basic statistics and
research methods will suffice in many cases to reveal the
benefits and limitations associated with much of the research
41

See generally David L. Faigman, Judges as “Amateur Scientists,” 86 B.U. L.
REV. 1207 (2006).
42
Brief of American Psychological Ass’n, and the Missouri Psychological
Ass’n as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 4-12, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No.
03-633), 2004 WL 1636447.
43
David L. Faigman, Making Moral Judgments Through Behavioural
Science: The “Substantial Lack of Volitional Control” Requirement in Civil
Commitments, 2 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 309 (2003).
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courts must consider. Second, especially in high profile
constitutional cases, the Court will have considerable help in
understanding the state of the art of the science. The Court
suffers no shortage of amici when it comes to answering
empirical questions about issues such as the onset of viability,44
whether a health exception is necessary to a ban on partial
birth abortions,45 the developmental capacities of juveniles,46
the effects of physician-assisted suicide,47 the effects of virtual
child pornography,48 and similar factual questions. Finally,
although the Court is reluctant to employ this aid, all courts
have the inherent authority to appoint experts to assist them
with complex technical subjects.49
4. Determining the Contents of Conclusions
A pervasive and troubling concern present in all
scientific research, but particularly in the social sphere, is the
danger that researchers will graft their values onto their
conclusions.50 It may be assumed that, in many cases, what
initially attracts researchers to legal problems is the hope to
reform legal rules they view as “substantively” wrong. In
researching the factual context of a legal rule with which social
scientists disagree, they may unwittingly (or wittingly)
interpret their data as more supportive of a particular
normative position than the data actually compel. Although
natural scientists share this source of difficulty, they do so to a
lesser degree because a natural scientist’s inquiry tends to be
less inherently value-laden.51 Although it may be impossible to
completely eradicate a researcher’s hopes and fears from
coloring his or her conclusions, these prejudices are not fatal to
44

See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
See Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007).
46
See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
47
See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); see also infra notes 88104 and accompanying text.
48
See Aschcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002).
49
See DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LABORATORY OF JUSTICE: THE SUPREME COURT’S
200-YEAR STRUGGLE TO INTEGRATE SCIENCE AND THE LAW 360 (2004) (reporting
interviews with Justices Stevens, O’Connor, and Breyer, who commented on “how
unusual” the Court’s appointment of a technical adviser would be).
50
NAGEL, supra note 15, at 488-89; see also John Passmore, Can the Social
Sciences Be Value-Free?, in READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 674 (H. Feigl &
M. Brodbeck eds., 1953).
51
All scientists, whether natural or social, whose work potentially impacts
public policy formation confront this issue. See, e.g., Jocelyn Kaiser, Taking a Stand:
Ecologists on a Mission to Save the World, 287 SCIENCE 1188 (2000).
45
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scientific social inquiry. At the science and law intersection,
lawyers and social scientists share the burden of identifying
and reducing the bias from research findings.
For their part, researchers must be forthcoming,
possibly by stating explicitly their substantive biases entirely
separately from their scientific findings.52 Of course, such a
practice will never be totally effective because many value
preferences are not fully known to the scientist, or their effect
on the analysis is not fully understood.53 Nonetheless, a greater
recognition of the problem will likely mitigate its effect.
Additionally, social scientists should display more modesty
when evaluating the significance of their findings. Sometimes
researchers exude the confidence in their conclusions that
their one study has settled the matter for the law. Rarely, if
ever, is one study so conclusive that a legal rule can rest solely
upon it.54
Lawyers must also take responsibility for identifying
bias where it occurs in empirical research. This means that
lawyers must understand more than the conclusions advanced;
they must also consider how the findings were obtained. For
this purpose, the most important section for lawyers to read
and understand in a scientific paper is the methods section.
There, the researcher explains the design of the study,
describes the sample population, defines—concretely (that is,
operationally)—the question addressed, and describes the
statistics used to measure subjects’ responses. The worth, or
worthlessness, of a study can almost always be discerned from
the methods section. Only if one understands how the study
was conducted can one evaluate the soundness of the
researcher’s conclusions.
The ability of readers of the scientific literature to identify errors due to extraneous factors should not be overstated,
because some errant variables will not be observable in the
methods, or any other, section. A multitude of unanticipated
factors could influence the findings of a particular study or
series of studies. But in the long-term, the ordinary checks
inherent in the scientific enterprise can be relied upon to
expose the biases, unconscious or conscious, of the researchers.
52

NAGEL, supra note 15, at 489.
Id.
54
See Michael J. Mahoney, Experimental Methods and Outcome Evaluation,
46 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 660, 660 (1978) (“The perfect experiment has
yet to be designed and is, in some sense, inconceivable.” (citation omitted)).
53
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Professor Nagel explained the dynamics of this system as
follows:
[M]odern science encourages the invention, the mutual exchange,
and the free but responsible criticisms of ideas; it welcomes
competition in the quest for knowledge between independent
investigators, even when their intellectual orientations are different;
and it progressively diminishes the effects of bias by retaining only
those proposed conclusions of its inquiries that survive critical
examination by an indefinitely large community of students,
whatever be their value preferences or doctrinal commitments.55

The conclusion that value biases influence the lessons
researchers draw from their data is less surprising than the
suggestion that lawmakers can be so easily misled by that bias.
The methods and conclusions of social science research are like
the premises and conclusions of legal argument: the validity of
the premises must be determined in order to assess the
soundness of the conclusions that the premises purportedly
compel. Just as no good lawyer would accept a legal conclusion
without examining the validity of the premises, no good
lawmaker should accept research findings without examining
how they were obtained.
5. Dividing Fact from Value
A fundamental criticism of scientific social inquiry
concerns the assertion that fact and value are distinguishable
in social inquiry. Critics argue that in studying purposive
human behavior, value judgments invariably become intertwined with the descriptions of that behavior.56 Specifically, in
the ordinary course of describing and categorizing events,
social scientists cannot help but make evaluative judgments.
The alternative of describing discrete factual events would be
cumbersome, simplistic, and probably misleading. An arguable
instance of this criticism is the psychological study of children’s
competence, an issue discussed above. It might be argued that
an unavoidable consequence of studying competence is the
55
NAGEL, supra note 15, at 489-90; see generally DAVID L. HULL, SCIENCE AS
PROCESS: AN EVOLUTIONARY ACCOUNT OF THE SOCIAL AND CONCEPTUAL
DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENCE (1988).
56
See Fineman & Opie, supra note 14, at 130 (“The data can never be totally
separated from the political, personal, and professional opinions of the person
manipulating them.”); William C. Whitford, Critical Empiricism, 14 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 61, 62 (1989) (asserting the impossibility of fully separating description from
evaluation); see also Howard T. Markey, Jurisprudence or “Juriscience”?, 25 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 525, 529 (1984).
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inevitable value judgment required by that categorization. This
criticism, however, misconstrues the evaluative role of social
scientific inquiry.
Without denying that many researchers blur factual
judgments and value judgments in the course of scientific
inquiry, in principle these judgments can be kept distinct.
Professor Nagel noted that confusion often arises from the
failure to distinguish between “characterizing value judgments” and “appraising value judgments.”57 He provided the
following example of a characterizing value judgment from
biology:
Animals with blood streams sometimes exhibit the condition known
as “anemia.” An anemic animal has a reduced number of red blood
corpuscles, so that, among other things, it is less able to maintain a
constant internal temperature than are members of its species with
a “normal” supply of such blood cells. However, although the
meaning of the term “anemia” can be made quite clear, it is not in
fact defined with complete precision. . . . [T]o decide whether a given
animal is anemic, an investigator must judge whether the available
evidence warrants the conclusion that the specimen is anemic. . . .
When the investigator reaches a conclusion, he can therefore be said
to be making a “value judgment,” in the sense that he has in mind
some standardized type of physiological condition designated as
“anemia” and he assesses what he knows about his specimen with
the measure provided by this assumed standard.58

In addition to the assessment that the animal is anemic,
a biologist might assert that this condition is undesirable
because of the animal’s inability to maintain itself. Professor
Nagel referred to such expressions of approval or disapproval
as “appraising value judgments.”59 To be sure, at times the
terminology of social inquiry make fact/value distinctions
difficult, with characterizing value judgments often implying
appraising value judgments. But this point counsels caution. It
does not contravene the capacity of social scientists to make the
distinction.
By distinguishing characterizing value judgments from
appraising value judgments, one can understand the factual
nature of social scientific inquiry into children’s competence.
For example, psychologists interested in children’s competence
have gleaned certain characteristics from case law associated

57
58
59

NAGEL, supra note 15, at 493.
Id. at 492-93 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 493.
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with various areas of legal competence.60 In studying this
question, researchers typically compare children of different
ages to adults (who are presumed competent by the law) on
these factors.61 Subsequent characterizations of certain children
as competent is analogous to the biologist’s characterizations
concerning anemia in animals. The researcher classifies the
subject group either within or outside the category of
competence based on the identified characterizing criteria.
Whether the psychological measure of competence adequately
meets the legal conception of competence, therefore, remains
challengeable separately in the same way that the factors
characterizing anemia may be challenged. But in no respect
does the characterizing value judgment that children of a
certain age are “competent” entail a corresponding appraising
value judgment.
In fact, psychological studies that find children as young
as fifteen comparable to adults in their competency to make
important decisions may be cited to support widely divergent
legal conclusions. Whereas this research may support
children’s participation in decisions of commitment to mental
hospitals62 and autonomous abortion decisions,63 it may also
support juveniles’ waivers of Miranda rights.64 Indeed,
children’s competencies was a hotly disputed issue in Roper v.
Simmons, in which Justice Kennedy cited social science
research in support of exempting minors from capital
punishment, while Justice Scalia, dissenting, decried the
disingenuity of social scientists who proclaimed minors’
capacities in abortion cases but disavowed those capacities in
capital cases.65 Although the cognitive ability of children is a
60

See, e.g., GRISSO, supra note 39, at 41-58.
See, e.g., id. at 95-97; Weithorn & Campbell, supra note 39, at 1591.
62
See Weithorn & Campbell, supra note 39, at 1596.
63
See Gary B. Melton & Anita J. Pliner, Adolescent Abortion: A Psychological
Analysis, in ADOLESCENT ABORTION: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES 5 (G. Melton
ed. 1986).
64
GRISSO, supra note 39, at 194 (noting research finding that juveniles
between the ages of 15 and 16 with I.Q. scores above 80 “demonstrate[] a level of
understanding and perception similar to that of 17- to 21-year-old adults for whom the
competence to waive rights is presumed in law.”).
65
Compare Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) (“Three general
differences between juveniles under 18 and adults demonstrate that juvenile offenders
cannot with reliability be classified among the worst offenders.”) with Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 616-17 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he American
Psychological Association (APA), which claims in this case that scientific evidence
shows persons under 18 lack the ability to take moral responsibility for their decisions,
has previously taken precisely the opposite position before this very Court.”). See
61
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scientific question, the legal consequences that befall
competent and incompetent children remain policy choices.
Psychologists and economists may be able to identify some of
the consequences of choosing one course over another, but they
can never offer scientific judgments on what effects are better
avoided. Therefore, a court may continue to hold that fifteenyear-old children should not be consulted when committed to
mental hospitals, even though they generally may be as
competent to make important decisions as adults. This result
can be justified by a concern for family autonomy66 or a
recognition of competing parental rights.67 When confronted by
conflicting value choices, courts must exercise their best
judgment in light of all of the information available. Where
relevant and valid, social science research can help clarify the
available choices.
6. Assessing the Evidence
In addition to accusations that a researcher’s values
affect her conclusions, critics claim that bias may enter into the
very assessment of data.68 There are at least three distinct
variants of this claim: First, a researcher’s social position and
educational training influence the kinds of evidence deemed
important. Second, the statistical decision rules employed by
researchers mask important value choices.69 And third, a
researcher’s relative “social perspective” impedes attempts to
identify “universal” principles.70
Whether a researcher’s social status affects the kinds of
evidence he or she deems relevant to social inquiry is an
empirical question.71 Some support may be expected for the
assertion that a researcher’s socioeconomic, religious, and
political views play some part in the assessment of data. But,
as the previous discussion indicates, manifestations of such
bias are recognizable by careful review of the measures applied
generally Joseph L. Hoffmann, On the Perils of Line-Drawing: Juveniles and the Death
Penalty, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 229 (1989).
66
See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 598-604 (1979).
67
See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 73 (1976).
68
See NAGEL, supra note 15, at 495.
69
See generally Rudner, The Scientist Qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments,
in INTRODUCTORY READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 492 (E.D. Klemke et al.
eds., 3d ed. 1998).
70
NAGEL, supra note 15, at 498-99.
71
Id. at 495-96.
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in the research. Once prejudice is identified, a study’s findings
may be discounted or dismissed accordingly.
A more technical objection to the problem of assessing
evidence concerns the statistical rules that researchers use to
decide if any effect has occurred. When comparing sample
populations in order to determine whether some variable had
an effect, two types of error are possible. A researcher may
conclude that the factor of interest did have an effect when it
did not (type I error, or “false positive”); or the researcher may
conclude that the factor of interest had no effect when it did
(type II error, or “false negative”). Social scientists are well
acquainted with these sources of error and have devised
various strategies to avoid them. The present criticism,
however, is directed not at the possibility of error, but instead
at the values employed when deciding to avoid one error at the
expense of possibly committing the other.
Consider, for example, a group of hypothetical
researchers who are interested in whether the death penalty is
a deterrent. Hypothesizing that capital punishment lowers
murder rates, they might compare states with capital
punishment to a comparison group of states that do not. Upon
comparison, the researchers find different murder rates
between the two groups, but must decide whether they are
“significant” enough to conclude that the death penalty made
the difference; after all, some differences should be expected as
a matter of chance. In assessing the data, the researchers must
be cognizant of the possibility of committing one of the two
types of error mentioned above. If they make a type I error,
they will erroneously conclude that the death penalty had a
deterrent effect when it did not. Alternatively, they might
make a type II error, erroneously concluding that the death
penalty had no deterrent effect when it did. Unfortunately, the
researchers cannot eliminate or fully minimize the chance of
making both types of error at the same time, and therefore
must decide which error is more important to avoid. It appears,
therefore, that researchers cannot avoid importing their values
into the assessment of data.
Although this example illustrates a valid source of
concern, the magnitude of the problem is not as great as it
might first appear. Within the social sciences, certain conventions have arisen that minimize an experimenter’s independent
judgment regarding drawing statistical conclusions from data.
In particular, the much discussed convention of a .05 confidence level restricts researchers to the relatively conservative
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risk of a five percent chance of making a type I error.
Specifically, in the example above, this means that the
researchers will mistakenly conclude that the death penalty
has a deterrent effect five or fewer times out of a hundred if the
death penalty is not a deterrent.72 On some occasions,
researchers might wish to lessen the risk of making a type I
error by adopting a more conservative level of confidence, say
one out of one hundred (.01). Similarly, less concern with
making a type I error may lead a researcher to adopt a less
conservative level of confidence, possibly ten out of one
hundred (.10). Without question, scientists’ value preferences
can affect the setting of confidence levels in a way that makes
drawing a particular conclusion more or less difficult. Ideally,
these judgments should be the responsibility of lawmakers. In
any case, the standard selected should always be made explicit
so that readers understand the decision rule the scientist
applied in stating the conclusion. Departures from .05, and
indeed even the decision to use a value of .05, should be
scrutinized independently by anyone relying on a researcher’s
findings. Once again, the important lesson is that a review of a
researcher’s methodological discretion illuminates biases
potentially affecting the reported findings.
The third and most “radical” claim that values influence
the assessment of data maintains that a “necessary logical
connection” exists between the researcher’s social perspective
and the method and understanding of what is studied,
rendering lessons from one time or place of no relevance to
another time or place. Knowledge of societal or cultural facts,
according to this view, is context specific. Therefore, the factual
validity of a social finding can only be understood by knowing
the society from which it emerged. As Professor Nagel
explained the criticism, “there is no analysis of social
phenomena which is not the expression of some special social
standpoint, or which does not reflect the interests and values
dominant in some sector of the human scene at a certain stage
of its history.”73
Although the claim typically excludes the natural
sciences from its critical gaze, natural scientists also must
state conclusions in a manner dependent on context. For
instance, simply measuring the velocity of a stone dropped
72
Put succinctly, the p-value is the probability of incorrectly rejecting the
null hypothesis when the null hypothesis is true.
73
NAGEL, supra note 15, at 498.
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from a fixed point requires specification of the system of
measurement used as well as a statement of the experimental
conditions under which the measurement is taken. The
situational dependence of this example is complicated further
by adding the perspective of the observer. Albert Einstein
provided the paradigmatic illustration of this complication:
I stand at the window of a railway carriage which is traveling
uniformly, and drop a stone on the embankment, without throwing
it. Then, disregarding the influence of the air resistance, I see the
stone descend in a straight line. A pedestrian who observes the
misdeed from the footpath notices that the stone falls to earth in a
parabolic curve. I now ask: Do the “positions” traversed by the stone
lie “in reality” on a straight line or on a parabola?74

Absolute objectivity, it would seem, is unattainable even
in natural science. There is thus no “God’s-eye-view” of the
world that is discoverable by science, at least not without
specifying the mountaintop on which He stands. Yet,
substantial objectivity, or what Professor Nagel refers to as
“relational objectivity,” is achieved when natural scientists
identify invariant connections between factors. As a matter of
logic, natural science can, and often does, identify relations
which are demonstrable within the specifications established
by experiment and which transcend particular value
orientations or social perspectives.
The social sciences also operate in relationally specific
contexts. To the extent that objectivity in the natural sciences
depends on identifying and then transcending specific
relational contexts, the social sciences, in principle, can do the
same. Even though two sets of experimental results may be the
product of separate social perspectives or value orientations,
additional research may seek out “common denominators”
from which results may be formulated, irrespective of the
researcher’s initial perspectives.75 The complaint that the new
synthesis suffers from a similar perspective-myopia can be
admitted, though it is hardly the fatal flaw social science’s
critics suppose. The goal for social science, as well as natural
science, is relative objectivity, not absolute objectivity.
A researcher’s values and social perspective inevitably
intrude into the identification of problems, the analysis of data,

74
ALBERT EINSTEIN, RELATIVITY; THE SPECIAL AND THE GENERAL THEORY 9
(Robert W. Lawson trans., Holt 1920).
75
NAGEL, supra note 15, at 501.
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and the conclusions drawn from the inquiry into social facts.
Adhering to the scientific method in such studies perhaps
provides only a limited, and not entirely satisfying, check on
the interference of researchers’ biases. But, however imperfect
the process might be, the benefits of a scientific social inquiry
are worth the effort.
B.

Amalgamation of Facts and Norms in Constitutional
Doctrine

In addition to the complicating reality that research on
social facts can be imbued with value preferences, courts and
scholars regularly conflate facts and values in constitutional
discourse. This is so in respect to both the language of the
Constitution itself and the rules and standards that give the
Constitution effect. The Constitution, for example, guarantees
the people the right to peaceably assemble and to be secure
against unreasonable searches and seizures. But what conduct
passes as peaceable and what actions are unreasonable are not
specified, though assemblages and searches and seizures are
easily enough imagined empirically. In applying the
necessarily imprecise words of the Constitution, the Court also
regularly fashions tests that are composites of fact and value.
The Constitution, for instance, limits congressional power to
regulate commerce to “interstate commerce.” In one application
of this doctrine, the Court asks whether the subject of
regulation “substantially affects interstate commerce.” When
the substantiality threshold has been crossed is a value
judgment that, surprisingly, has garnered little serious
scholarly attention.
In constitutional cases, therefore, the line dividing law
and fact is not a bright one. Indeed, it is so dim that courts and
commentators regularly fail to notice it. As a consequence,
normative and empirical arguments in constitutional litigation
tend to meld into one another and clarity is the primary victim.
For instance, Casey’s undue burden standard, mentioned
above, is explicitly contemplated as an empirically conscious
test of the constitutionality of pre-viability abortion regulations. Yet in neither the case itself nor in subsequent case law
has the Court adequately defined the normative component
represented by the term “undue” or the empirical component
represented by the term “burden.” Instead, the undue burden
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standard, in practice, is ill-defined both normatively and
empirically.76
In constitutional litigation, as is the case in most
litigation, the division of responsibility between judge and trier
of fact (jury or judge) is allocated on the basis of the nature of
the issue presented. Matters of pure law are the exclusive
responsibility of judges and matters of pure fact are resolved by
triers of fact. The third category, and the one in which most
constitutional facts fall, are mixed questions of fact and law. In
ordinary litigation, these categories tend to define the line
between judge and jury. In constitutional cases, in contrast,
judges often—albeit not always—act in the dual capacity of
determiner of law and finder of fact. Nonetheless, for a variety
of reasons, the categories of pure law, pure fact, and mixed
questions of fact and law, are an important component of
constitutional adjudication.
Questions of pure law involve the interpretation of the
Constitution and the setting forth of doctrine. In practice,
purely legal questions thus concern the definition of the rules
and standards that are applied in constitutional adjudication.
Examples range from whether “fighting words” sometimes
qualify as “speech” within the First Amendment77 to whether
congressional actions must “affect” or “substantially affect”
interstate commerce.78 In the Casey example from above, it was
a purely legal question whether the Fourteenth Amendment’s
protection of reproductive liberty should be implemented
pursuant to the “undue burden” standard or the more
traditional strict scrutiny test. This issue is reserved
exclusively for judges to decide. This category of purely legal
questions, therefore, encompasses all matters of doctrinal
definition. It is under this doctrinal edifice that pure facts and
mixed questions of fact and law are ultimately decided.
In non-constitutional cases, “case-specific facts” (also
known as “pure facts” or “historical facts”)79 fuel the engine of
76
See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007); Stenberg v. Carhart,
530 U.S. 914 (2000).
77
Compare R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 387-88 (1992) (finding
that “content-based” regulation of fighting words violated the First Amendment), with
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942) (holding that prohibition
against “classical fighting words” fell outside the bounds of constitutional protection).
78
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (criticizing earlier
Commerce Clause cases for failing to impose substantiality requirement to applicable
test).
79
If forced to choose between these two terms, I prefer “pure facts,” though
like the term “truth,” it promises more than it can possibly deliver. In constitutional
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litigation. Such facts play a more modest role in constitutional
cases. Indeed, although case-specific facts occur throughout
constitutional law, they typically must be digested by
applicable doctrine and come to be treated as mixed questions
of fact and law. For example, in Scott v. Harris, the plaintiffmotorist claimed that the defendant police officer acted
unreasonably and violated his Fourth Amendment rights when
the officer forced the motorist off the road during a high-speed
chase.80 As the Court explained, the circumstances of the car
chase raised factual issues that had to be resolved in light of
the evidence available and pursuant to ordinary rules of
procedure.81 Once these case-specific facts were determined, the
question whether the officer acted in an objectively reasonable
fashion became a legal question. The process of evaluating the
facts against the applicable legal standard is designated as a
mixed question of law and fact. According to the Court, “[i]n
determining the reasonableness of the manner in which a
seizure is effected, ‘[w]e must balance the nature and quality of
the intrusion in the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests
against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to
justify the intrusion.’”82
As a practical matter, therefore, although case-specific
facts can be readily identified in constitutional cases, they
virtually always must be evaluated under some constitutional
rule of decision. Whether this or that fact is constitutionally
protected or unprotected is a legal question. In Scott, for
instance, the plaintiff-motorist argued that the constitutionality of the officer’s action in forcing him off the road during a
high-speed car chase should have been controlled by the
outcome in Tennessee v. Garner.83 In Garner, the Court found
that an officer had used excessive force when he shot a fleeing
unarmed burglary suspect in the back of the head.84 The
constitutional issue presented in Scott and Garner was the
cases, the term “historical facts” is confusing, since judges often look to history (i.e.,
original intent) to answer questions of pure law and mixed questions of law and fact. I
use the term “case-specific facts” to avoid this confusion. Case-specific facts refer to the
who, why, where, what, and how of some event or occurrence having constitutional
import.
80
127 S. Ct. 1769, 1773 (2007).
81
In Scott, the plaintiff had lost at summary judgment, so the relevant facts
had to be determined with “all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party to the extent
supportable by the record.” Id. at 1776 (emphasis omitted).
82
Id. at 1778 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)).
83
Id. at 1777; see generally Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
84
Garner, 471 U.S. at 21.
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same. Given the facts presented,85 did the police act in an
objectively reasonable way? The Scott Court concluded,
however, that the same rule-of-decision dictated different
outcomes. The Court stated that “the threat posed by the flight
on foot of an unarmed suspect [was not] even remotely
comparable to the extreme danger to human life posed by [the
fleeing motorist] in this case.”86
As Scott illustrates, ordinary case-specific facts can be
incorporated into constitutional lawmaking through the
decisional rules established pursuant to the Constitution.
Hence, the plain facts of the car chase were evaluated under
the normative reasonableness standard contained in the
Fourth Amendment. But constitutional facts are rarely as plain
or unambiguous as Scott’s car chase, which was captured on
video. Indeed, most facts having constitutional relevance are
not simple case-specific facts, like Scott’s car chase, but instead
are complex scientific or general historical facts, like viability
or the intentions of the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment
or the effects of violent television on young viewers.
Although they might be the subject of numerous and
intricate scientific studies, facts such as “viability” or the
“effects of violent television” can still be identified separately
and then integrated into constitutional lawmaking.87 Consider,
as a case study, the complex empirical issues surrounding
physician-assisted suicide that were presented in Washington
v. Glucksberg.88 The plaintiffs in Glucksberg claimed that a
person who is terminally ill and mentally competent should
have the right to choose what form his or her death would take,
and have the right to a physician’s assistance in exercising that
right.89 The plaintiffs claimed that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause extended to “the liberty to choose
85
The division of the issue into “pure facts” and the legal resolution of those
facts raises the question of the respective responsibilities between trier of fact and
judge as a practical matter. Space precludes consideration of this issue in the essay.
86
Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1777.
87
The complexities surrounding historical facts, such as the original
intentions of the drafters of the Second Amendment, are beyond the scope of this essay.
As a general matter, however, the methods of historical exploration are sufficiently
similar to the methods many social scientists use in that most of the lessons drawn
here regarding science and scientists should apply to history and historians as well.
See HAACK, supra note 5, at 24 (comparing the methods of science to “what historians
or detectives or investigative journalists or the rest of us do when we really want to
find something out”).
88
521 U.S. 702 (1997).
89
Id. at 722.
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how to die,” or “the right to choose a humane, dignified
death.”90 The Court, however, with Chief Justice Rehnquist
writing, defined the asserted right as the “right to commit
suicide which itself includes a right to assistance in doing so.”91
It is, of course, a basic principle of hornbook law
that the existence or non-existence of a fundamental right
ordinarily dictates the level of judicial review that is accorded a
disputed state action. Hence, if the plaintiffs’ view prevailed, so
that the right to physician-assisted death was deemed a
fundamental right, the state would be obligated to justify
infringements or limitations of the exercise of that right by
demonstrating that its action was narrowly tailored to advance
a compelling government interest. If the right was deemed
a liberty interest but not fundamental, the state’s burden
would be substantially lighter, and would require only that
the action was rationally related to a legitimate government
interest. The Court had little difficulty in finding that the
right, given its definition as the right to commit suicide, was
not fundamental. “[F]or over 700 years,” Rehnquist explained,
“the Anglo-American common law tradition has punished or
otherwise disapproved of both suicide and assisting suicide.”92
Under the Court’s interpretation, therefore, the state did not
have to advance and prove a strong justification for its prohibition of assisted suicide. But the legal posture of Glucksberg
turns out to be more complicated, as the concurring opinions of
Justices Stevens and Souter make clear.
Justice Stevens wrote separately to emphasize that the
Court’s holding did not preclude later protection of a terminally
ill patient’s right to assistance in hastening death. The Court,
he stated, merely found that the Washington statute prohibiting suicide was not invalid “on its face.”93 The Court’s decision
“does not foreclose the possibility that some applications of
the statute might well be invalid.”94 In particular, Stevens
contemplated a case in which a mentally competent person
who is terminally ill and suffering excruciating pain seeks a
physician’s help to facilitate the end. “The liberty interest at
stake in a case like this,” Stevens said, “is an interest in

90
91
92
93
94

Id. at 703.
Id. at 723.
Id. at 711.
Id. at 739 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id.
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deciding how, rather than whether, a critical threshold shall
be crossed.”95
Justice Souter also wrote separately to point out that
Glucksberg sits atop a constitutional fault-line that might shift
as our understanding of the empirical landscape changes.
Souter sought to reconcile Rehnquist’s majority opinion finding
no right to assisted suicide and Stevens’s presaging the next
case down the line, which presents the sympathetic situation of
the competent terminally ill patient in debilitating pain who
wants to choose a dignified end to a dignified life. Souter wrote
that the core concern in these cases was fact-based.
Souter asserted that the state has no interest in denying
a competent terminally ill patient in debilitating pain his or
her choice of how to die. According to Souter, the state’s
legitimate interest lies in averting mistakes, in precluding
assisted suicide from becoming directed suicide. The state thus
rationally fears the slippery slope that once a procedure is set
in place that permits some to freely choose death, others will be
encouraged or even forced into this choice. “The nub of this part
of the State’s argument is not that such patients are
constitutionally undeserving of relief on their own account, but
that any attempt to confine a right of physician assistance to
the circumstances presented by these doctors is likely to fail.”96
Whether the state is correct that compassionate
assistance in dying ineluctably leads to involuntary euthanasia
is an empirical question. In the majority opinion, Chief Justice
Rehnquist cited and discussed at length a study from the
Netherlands designed to test this hypothesis. According to
Rehnquist, the 1990 Dutch study reported “2,300 cases of
voluntary euthanasia (defined as ‘the deliberate termination of
another’s life at his request’), 400 cases of assisted suicide, and
more than 1,000 cases of euthanasia without an explicit
request.”97 More profoundly disturbing, Rehnquist reported
that, in addition to those 1,000 cases, “the study found an
additional 4,941 cases where physicians administered lethal
morphine overdoses without the patients’ explicit consent.”98
Rehnquist concluded that the Dutch study

95
96
97
98

Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 745.
Id. at 754 (Souter, J., concurring).
Id. at 734 (majority opinion).
Id.
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suggests that, despite the existence of various reporting procedures,
euthanasia in the Netherlands has not been limited to competent,
terminally ill adults who are enduring physical suffering, and that
regulation of the practice may not have prevented abuses in cases
involving vulnerable persons, including severely disabled neonates
and elderly persons suffering from dementia.99

Justice Souter, however, found the empirical record
more mixed. On the one hand, some commentators found that
Dutch guidelines have “proved signally ineffectual; nonvoluntary euthanasia is now widely practised and increasingly
condoned in the Netherlands.”100 On the other hand, some
researchers have found the opposite, that “Dutch physicians
are not euthanasia enthusiasts and they are slow to practice it
in individual cases.”101 Souter concluded that he could not say
with any “assurance which side is right.”102
Ordinarily, when the fact of the matter is uncertain,
procedural burdens of proof allocate the risks of error and
guide decision making. Standards of proof should be based on
underlying normative considerations associated with the costs
of making a mistake. This is why the burden of proof in civil
cases is the preponderance standard, but is beyond a
reasonable doubt in criminal cases. In constitutional cases,
such allocation ought to depend on the constitutional values
found to be implicit in the text. In Glucksberg, this issue
depended on the Court’s interpretation of the due process
clause. The main area of focus, as set forth in the Stevens and
Souter opinions, was whether the due process clause might
extend protection to a competent, terminally ill patient, who
was in debilitating pain. According to Stevens, “[a]voiding
intolerable pain and the indignity of living one’s final days
incapacitated and in agony is certainly ‘at the heart of [the]
liberty . . . to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning,
of the universe, and the mystery of human life.’”103 If Stevens’s
position is correct, then the state should have the burden to
demonstrate that procedural protections cannot be enacted to
99

Id.
Id. at 786 (Souter, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(citing and quoting John Keown, Euthanasia in the Netherlands: Sliding Down the
Slippery Slope?, in EUTHANASIA EXAMINED 261, 289 (John Keown ed., 1995)).
101
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing and quoting RICHARD A.
EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE ? 322 (1997)).
102
Id.
103
Id. at 745 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring) (alterations in original) (citing
and quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
100
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avoid involuntary euthanasia if it seeks to entirely proscribe
assisted suicide for the terminally ill, competent patient
suffering intolerable pain. Accordingly, the Constitution would
guarantee the right of physician-assisted suicide in a select
group of cases until states adequately demonstrated that
procedural mechanisms were unavailable to avoid the slide into
involuntary euthanasia.
Oddly, Justice Souter failed to follow this basic logic
when he reached the issue of how the empirical question might
be resolved in future cases. According to him, the Court’s
decision regarding whether the right to die is constitutionally
based should await state experimentation to determine
whether there is a workable stopping point between assisted
suicide and involuntary euthanasia. He stated that the Court
should “stay its hand” until the state legislatures had ample
opportunity to study the question. But Souter essentially put
the horse behind the cart. The existence of a constitutional
right to assisted suicide should not depend on whether
procedural protections can be constructed to avoid having the
right to die turn into the duty to die. This factual issue, the
subject of the Dutch research and Souter’s hoped-for subject of
future American research, concerns the government’s interest
in curtailing the claimed right to die. The fundamental right to
autonomy over death, if it exists, exists separately from the
state’s claimed reasons for regulating or prohibiting it.104
By analogy, states have often sought to regulate violent
pornography on the basis that it makes consumers of it more
prone to be violent.105 Violent pornography falls within the
protection of the First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech.
This means that violent pornography cannot be prohibited
until the state demonstrates empirically that it causes violence.
Thus, the right is protected first, and government claims of
compelling reasons to permit regulation of it must be proved—a
demand that might take considerable time and effort on the

104
This practice of using a state’s asserted justification for infringing a right
as a basis for finding that no right exists in the first instance is not unique to Justice
Souter. It can be found throughout the Court’s cases. See Lawrence H. Tribe and
Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV.
1057, 1096-97 (1990). Its frequency, however, does not render it legitimate. See David
L. Faigman, Reconciling Individual Rights and Government Interests: Madisonian
Principles Versus Supreme Court Practice, 78 VA. L. REV. 1521, 1539 (1992).
105
See, e.g., Am. Booksellers Ass’n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir.
1985) (invalidating Indiana’s anti-pornography statute, which, among other things,
proscribed violent pornography).
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part of legislatures. Contrary to Souter’s argument, this has
not interfered with public officials studying the issue of the
effects of violent pornography and, indeed, this topic has been
the subject of substantial research attention as well as two
presidential commissions.106 In fact, placing the burden on
legislatures is likely to produce more research, not less, since
states need to generate evidence to justify their legislation.
Hence, the free speech right exists and continues to be
protected until legislatures develop sufficient proof to
demonstrate a compelling interest to justify infringements of
that right. There is no reason why exactly the same sort of
analysis should not apply to assisted dying.
Recognizing that the Constitution evolves as society—
and, more particularly, our factual understanding of society—
changes does not make the Constitution any less “durable”
than Souter’s institutional deference to legislatures in
Glucksberg would make it. In his universe, the Constitution
“changes” if the legislative answer is that procedural protections can be instituted to ensure that assisted dying does
not become forced euthanasia. At that point in time, the
Glucksberg ruling would have to be “amended” to permit the
right to die so long as it is accompanied by whatever procedural
protections the states come up with to prevent involuntary
euthanasia. In the alternative, the Constitution “changes” if
assisted dying is protected today, but legislatures demonstrate
tomorrow that procedural controls are ineffective. States would
have demonstrated that they have a compelling interest in
prohibiting all assisted suicides, because the practice cannot be
limited to the small group in which it is appropriate. The only
question is what is to be the default position. In the absence of
sound empirical research one way or the other, does assisted
suicide receive constitutional protection or does it not? The
empirical question of the availability of procedural controls
adequate to avoid involuntary euthanasia must be evaluated in
light of the answer to this question. This is a matter of
constitutional interpretation. Science cannot say what the
Constitution means, but it can provide a window into the world
so that constitutional values can be justly applied. Science thus
informs the constitutional analysis.

106
See generally ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY: FINAL
REPORT (1986); THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY
(1970).
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In the example of physician-assisted suicide, science
should play a pivotal role in deciding actual cases. But it does
not displace classic constitutional value definition. Indeed, it
should clarify it. This issue presents an archetypal clash of
irreconcilable principles. On the one hand, the state declares
an abiding and weighty interest in protecting life, including
especially the weak and vulnerable who might be hastened
toward death in a general scheme permitting assisted suicide.
On the other hand, due process guarantees individuals the
liberty to make decisions regarding core attributes of their
lives, which, under certain circumstances, includes how their
lives end. Although the weight of the state’s interest in life or
the magnitude of the costs associated with an individual’s loss
of liberty if forced to endure his or her final days in intolerable
pain are normative judgments, the empirical realities endemic
to this clash of principles are readily determinable. A fair and
just determination of constitutional cases cannot be achieved
without a sound and accurate understanding of the world to
which those decisions apply.
When facts are relevant under particular constitutional
rules or standards, courts should strive to define and understand them separate from the constitutional norms that apply.
If a regulation operates as an obstacle to the exercise of a
woman’s constitutionally protected right to a pre-viability
abortion, for instance, that fact can be independently
determined. Once it is determined—albeit with all of the
limitations and caveats associated with doing this research—
courts can separately resolve whether the obstacle is
“substantial” or the burden it puts on the right is “undue.”
Similarly, the factual question of whether physician-assisted
suicide increases the incidence of involuntary euthanasia is a
component of, but independent from, the constitutional norm of
whether physician-assisted suicide is a protected fundamental
right. Even the most fundamental of rights, such as political
speech, can be regulated if the government’s interests are
sufficiently compelling. Good research on physician-assisted
suicide should demonstrate whether the dangers of this
practice provide a compelling justification for prohibiting it. By
keeping constitutional value-definition separate from constitutional fact-finding, the analytical bases for constitutional
outcomes will be clearer and thereby more legitimate.
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CONCLUSION

III.

The question whether a world exists independent of our
minds’ perception of it would probably appear quite absurd to
the average lawyer or judge. The justices of the Supreme Court
would undoubtedly be amazed to be asked such a question.
They almost certainly subscribe to basic realist tenets, at least
in the belief that the world is mind-independent. The justices
would probably also share the realists’ belief that while
researchers’ values sometimes affect the conclusions they draw
about the mechanics of the “real world,” the methods of science
are well designed to limit or reveal those biases.
Yet, despite its likely realist orientation, the Court
repeatedly treats facts in constitutional cases in anti-realist
ways. In particular, the Court describes the factual world
constructively, so that the facts serve normative or interpretive
ends. The Court appears largely unconcerned with the actual
reality of the factual premises it relies upon. Anti-realists may
believe that this is an inevitable consequence of the task the
Court faces in integrating highly complex empirical information into the intricacies of constitutional doctrine. In this essay,
I argue that it is possible for the Court to employ a scientifically realist constitutional jurisprudence. In so concluding, I
consider two principal challenges to a realist approach in
constitutional cases. First, I reject the argument that the sorts
of facts the Constitution makes relevant—primarily social and
behavioral facts studied by social scientists—cannot be studied
objectively. Second, I describe how constitutional tests that
appear to be conglomerations of facts and values can be
separated into their component parts. While these challenges
are formidable, they are not insurmountable.
Constitutional rulings should be defined by the real
world because they define the real world. The Constitution is
an eminently practical document. Although cast for immortality, it is grounded in modern times and must attend to
contemporary circumstances. As John Marshall put it, the
Constitution was “intended to endure for ages to come, and,
consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human
affairs.”107 A constitution that is interpreted in disregard of a
sound understanding of empirical realities is exceedingly
unlikely to endure.
107

original).

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819) (emphasis in

